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(FOUO 13/79)

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10 April 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 13/79)



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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO WILL SEEK U.S. RECOGNITION AS SIGN OF 'GOOD WILL'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Mar 79 p 24 LD

[Report by Mohamed Selhami: "The PLO Will Continue the Struggle"]

[Excerpt] "The signing by al-Sadat of the American-Israeli-Egyptian agreements is meaningless to the PLO since the Arab world has unanimously condemned it," Ibrahim Sus, PLO permanent representative in Paris, told us. "If such a signing had immediately followed the visit to Jerusalem (19 November 1977), it would certainly have been difficult for the Arabs to counter it. But now, particularly since the Iranian revolution, the balance of power in the area has changed. Egypt is isolated and so is Israel, economically and politically."

The PLO's position has been strengthened by Jordan's. Following the Husayn-'Arafat meeting in Amman on Saturday 17 March, the Hashemite sovereign, who was to receive Zbigniew Brzezinski the next day, condemned the Israeli-Egyptian treaty and declared in favor of a Palestinian state.

The PLO has called for an Arab summit, at which it intends to demand implementation of all the secret resolutions passed at the Baghdad summit (2-5 November 1978)--particularly those which stipulate a series of political, economic, social and cultural sanctions against Egypt. In this respect, however, the PLO's demands are likely to come up against the reluctance of Saudi Arabia which, although condemning the treaty, is opposed to an economic boycott.

The moderate countries display roughly the same attitude as Riyadh. But the PLO intends to concentrate the main thrust of its offensive in the United Nations. According to Ibrahim Sus, it is going to demand implementation of the General Assembly resolutions concerning the Palestinian people's rights: "In this way we will be able to judge U.S. good will when it comes to seeking a just peace in the region. However, this good will should show itself first through recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

Parallel to this diplomatic campaign "on a large scale, the PLO will continue the armed struggle both inside and outside the occupied territories."

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IRAN

WOMEN WHO BELIEVED IN KHOMEYNI

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 19 Mar 79 pp 44-45

[Report on conversations with Iranian women by Kenize Mourad]

[Text] You laughed in my face, Nusrat, as you did, Soleyla, and as you did too, Nassrin, when I was in Iran a month ago expressing my concern about the place of women in an Islamic republic. That was the day after the victory. The people, led by fedayin and mujjaeddin groups, had conquered the barracks, emptied the arsenal and were now singing in the streets. You had participated in everything, under your long black chadors, in the great demonstrations, in the distributions of tracts, in the inspection of the arms and sometimes in the combats themselves. You were happy, proud, sure of yourselves, and the details of the Sharia, the Koranic law which specifically permits repudiation and polygamy, prescribes that the "honest woman" hide her hair and her form, and orders stoning for adultery, did not worry you very much. "Those are ancient customs," you would remark, "they will be adapted as a function of present conditions, as is the custom in Shiite Islam where the ijtihad, the interpretation of a great ayatollah is prescribed. In any event," you added, "in the Koran it is written that men and women are equal because they are created from the same essence."

Today you are uneasy. Thousands of Iranian women have demonstrated against wearing the chador and to demand equality of political, economic and social rights with men. And you too, under your black veil, you have demonstrated so that the choice may be left to each one whether she will veil herself or unveil herself. And you have been attacked, some women have even been wounded with daggers. Provocateurs? SAVAK agents who want to lessen the prestige of the new regime? Perhaps. But you are only half convinced of it: you know very well that there are fanatics and reactionary Mullahs who would be willing to profit from circumstances in order to find the place once again where 50 years ago they replaced "monarchy with mullarchy" and rest their authority on that half of the population which used to be easy to control: the women. You have won a preliminary battle: the Ayatollah Khomeini, who had asked you to cover "your heads, your necks, your arms and your legs," has conceded that this was "not an obligation but only... a duty."

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The Black Kerchief

Wearing that veil! You are annoyed that Westerners and a certain number of your compatriots give so much importance to it and that it should be considered as the symbol, the barometer of the evolution or of the liberty of Iranian women. "The French or American feminists were not as worried when under the Shah's dictatorship we were imprisoned and tortured. And, for that matter, what rights did we have? They tried to force us to accept values which were not our own, they interdicted access to the universities and to the schools to those women who wore the chador or even the hejab (a small kerchief for hiding the hair). With a great deal of publicity they tried to transform us into dolls, into sexual objects which would not be dangerous for the regime."

Dolls, sexual objects, the key words are spoken. Between 1966 and 1976 the consumption of beauty products in Teheran increased 500-fold. Is that the standard by which the progress of Iranian women is measured.

But the veil is not in itself a factor of progress anymore.... On that, you have argued among yourselves, you are not in agreement. "First of all, what veil? The chador is not a Moslem costume but an Iranian one. It existed among us long before Islam, Mohammed simply recommended that women should cover their hair and should not carry themselves in such a way as to excite men." "For me," Nusrat, a law student, declares, "to wear the chador was a political act, a sign of rallying against the regime of the Shah who forbade it. Now, like many Iranian women, I no longer wear either the chador or the hejab." As for Soleyla, she is a physical engineer. During the struggle, she also wore the chador, but today, in order to go to the factory where she works, the only female engineer among the workers, she finds the black fichu which hides her beautiful blond hair to be more comfortable.

All of you women speak to me of Ali Shariati, that Iranian philosopher who died in London three years ago. Some people claim that he was assassinated by the Shah's agents. Among you, his portraits cover the walls. "He was the real instigator of the Iranian Revolution. He turned the young people upside down by making them find once again the real sense of Islam, beyond the dusty traditions which blurred its image. He rejected the idea of the submissive Moslem woman which our families presented to us as a model. Between that traditional woman and the 'modern' woman who lives according to patterns imported from the West, we want to freely find our own identity."

Repudiation, Stoning

And the equality with men, for which you are struggling, is that according to the Koran? Repudiation, for example? "In Islam, woman always has had the right of divorce, while you Westerners have not received that right until recently and it is still forbidden by the Catholic Church. Under Islam, it

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is sufficient that it be specified in the marriage contract. But many people among us did not even know it; Khomeini reminded us of it in a recent speech."

And polygamy? It's spelled out in full in the Koran. What do you think, Nassrin, you who are married, of the opinions of the great Ayatollah of Machad, who declares that "as a rooster needs several hens, a man needs several women?" The Koran stipulates that a man may have four wives only if he loves all of them equally and if he treats them equally. That is impossible."

"If that were possible, if it is possible, would you accept?"

"No, unless I were very sick, so that I could not have sexual relations or if I could not have children."

"However, in spite of those reasons, it is in the Koran and you must accept it." Poor Nassrin, you blush, you nervously bite your fingers, you are torn between your loyalty to Islam and the reality of being a young woman in love. I have stopped my questioning because you were on the point of bursting into sobs.

And that couple who several days ago were flogged in the public square for an act of love outside the contract. A light penalty if it is compared to the stoning of the adulterous woman prescribed by the Koran. Soleyla rebelled: "They always speak of the stoning of the woman, but according to the law the man also is stoned."

"But things are not set up that way."

"No," you recognized, "but in fact Islam has put such conditions on stoning that it turns out to be almost impossible. It is necessary for four trustworthy witnesses to have seen the act while it was being consummated."

"However, Soleyla, don't you believe that if the Koranic law is re-established many jealous husbands or husbands who might just be tired of their wives might buy such witnesses?"

"Yes, of course," you sighed. "That is why, as Moslems, we do not wish only a change in the relationship between men and women, as we know very well that they are based on social relations of mendacity and exploitation. We want change in all of society."

If Khomeini is Mistaken

And suddenly, to my great stupefaction, I saw all three of you clad in your black chadors holding a conversation with me similar to that which I had heard a hundred times from Maoist or Trotskyist militants. A similar conversation, but still a little different, because you did not deny Islam even for a moment. "That Islamic republic is only a stage; our goal is a classless society. The central idea of Islam, is in fact the 'tohid': unity.

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The unity of God and the unity of the world. From that source flows the notion of tohidi society, a society without classes." For that ideal, Nassrin, you told me that you would voluntarily sacrifice your husband, your baby, your life. At the school of Shariati and of the mujjaeddin, you read Marx and Lenin: you are in agreement with their economic and social theories but not with their philosophical ideas. Like the Ayatollah Talagnahi, the one who has been called "the red bishop of Teheran" and the "father of the mujjaedin," you believe in socialism but you do not see in what way it is contradictory with the idea of God. "It was contradictory in a precise historical context where the Church upheld the owning class, but in Shiite Islam, the Ayatollahs are counted among the spokesmen of the people."

I hesitated a moment before the sacrilegious question: but if the Ayatollah, if Khomeini were mistaken? And very naturally you answered me, as on the night before the workers in the Awwaz factories had answered me: "If Khomeini is mistaken, if he does not express what we consider just, we shall reject him."

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IRAN

BRIEFS

ON KHOMEYNI'S BLACKLIST--A blacklist of 16,000 persons "forbidden to leave the country" has been communicated to all Iranian border posts. [Text]
[Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 26 Mar 79 p 36 WA]

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ISRAEL

ARTICLE EXAMINES HOW WAR HAS TRANSFORMED ZIONISM

[Article by Dr Aryeh Ya'ari: "From War-Zionism to Peace-Zionism"]

[Text] In order to understand how peace may make its contribution to Zionism, we should first examine how war — or rather the fact of being in a constant state of war — has been transforming Zionism.

It has been said again and again that Zionism is a movement of national liberation. But such a definition, as accurate and indispensable as it is, may fail, by seeming to be an over-simplified generalization. It is well known that each national movement possesses its own specific particularities, which are determined by the historic conditions which have created or formed it. The Zionist movement wanted to distinguish itself from all other national movements. While strength has been the political foundation of most national movements, the weakness of the Jewish people has been the political justification for Zionism. While most national movements have legitimated their rights and claims through presence and roots in their native soil, the Zionist movement has emphasized a lack of territory, exile, and a separation of the people from its land. Pinsker's "Auto-Emancipation" presented the formula:

"for the living, the Jew is a dead man;
for the natives, an alien and a vagrant;
for the rich, a beggar;
for the poor, a wealthy exploiter;
for patriots, a man without a country;
and in the eyes of all
a hated rival."

Such a people's liberation movement inevitably had a vital appeal to mankind's sense of justice.

Universal Principles and Values

Nationalism is strongly characterized by an emphasis on particularism -- to the degree of running the risk of ending in chauvinism and in the rejection of others. Zion-

ism, which is a movement of the rejected, had no alternative but to draw its inspiration from universal principles and values. For Moses Hess, the revival of the Jewish people and the redemption of all mankind went hand in hand. The aim of Zionism is not the Jewish people's differentiation, but rather its integration among the free nations of the world. All should have a right to independence, and every people should exist, free from any kind of oppression or discrimination. "The Jewish state will be, for the whole world needs its existence", said Herzl. Many other Zionist thinkers could be quoted who strongly support this view.

The Rise of Revisionism

But in this case, we have to deal with an unusual phenomenon: in most nationalist movements that have achieved independence, the extremist wing which led the way at the beginning of the process yielded ground to the moderates. The Zionist movement has gone the other way; the extremist wing, Jabotinsky's revisionism -- which had a marginal role for half a century -- has finally achieved power, and has taken over the helm of both the state and the movement. Its victory is not only political, it is ideological as well. Its slogans, such as "The Land of Israel on both banks of the Jordan", or (even worse) "Judah will rise by blood and fire", which were sheer laughing stock for a long time, have become quite acceptable. Following the 6 Day War, parts of this outlook even began to infect the ranks and the leadership of Labor Zionism. The difference between deformed Labor Zionism and militaristic Revisionism amounts to a tactical quar-

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rel about the best way to achieve the same results.

Self-Determination for Both Peoples

How far away in time we find ourselves today from the early Zionist leaders' declarations about rights to the land, which were to be equally bestowed upon both Jews and Arabs! In the thirties, Ben Gurion declared before a British Royal Commission that our aim was the creation of a bi-national state: "If we were offered a Jewish State we would refuse it", he said. And it was also the young Ben Gurion who wonderfully defined the position of Socialist-Zionism in terms of the acute problem of the Palestinian people's rights:

"I am whole-heartedly for the right of self-determination for every people."

"This right cannot be limited or conditioned because of its effect upon us or our affairs. There is no doubt but that the Arab peoples of the Land of Israel possess the right to self-determination. This right cannot be restricted out of fear that it might encumber our endeavors. The moral case of Zionist thought implies that a people — every people — constitute an end in itself. It is not an instrumentality for the attainment of objectives of other peoples."

"We seek that the Jewish people be a sovereign master of its destiny in history without being dependent on the will — yes, the good will of other peoples. Likewise, we seek the same for the Arabs. Even if the matter were entirely within our jurisdiction and subject to our will, we cannot view the Arabs of the Land of Israel as a means for our ends. We cannot determine the fate of their rights."

"It is possible that the consummation of Arab aims for self-determination might impose formidable difficulties upon us. However, that cannot serve as a principle to retract that right from the Arabs."

"A force lacking a moral foundation is transient. History has not established that physical might alone is sufficient to sustain rule for generations. We, in any case, cannot depend on a policy of physical might — even if we so desired. World public opinion — upon whose recognition and sympathy we depend — will insist that we exhibit the fullest benevo-

lence toward the neighboring people."

"Visions of Zionist political policy lacking fullest concern for Arab rights not only indicate an absence of sensibility and integrity — but that of political realism as well."

A comparison between this conception — which inspired a noble humanistic tradition — and the present opposition to the Palestinian's right to self-determination — equally shared by Jabotinsky's and Ben Gurion's successors — indicates how low the morals of the Zionist movement have fallen, somewhere along the road between its aspirations and its achievements. (The debates and the resolutions adopted during the last Zionist Congress — which were ratified by a strong majority, in spite of the laudable efforts of the left-wing minority — are a sad illustration of these statements.)

The Problem

What is the real problem? Is it an unavoidable evolutionary process that characterizes the road that many a nationalist movement has travelled? Lloyd George cried out: "I am in despair as I see small nations which have scarcely caught a glimpse of light and cannot wait to oppress other nations."

Collective ethics, even more than individual ethics, are both a product and a function of interests. But the fear and mistrust that hatred, adversity, and aggression have generated, all cloud the ability to make a clear distinction between genuine and specious interests. The stupefying rise of ultra-orthodox obscurantism which has joined forces with fanatic chauvinism, is an obvious symptom of the inauspicious process which the Zionist movement, once liberal and enlightened, has gone through.

The Impact of War

The only factor which explains this mutation is — war — which in the course of time became the fundamental condition and the permanent context of the relations between the Jews and the Arabs. The Arabs' implacable refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the national aspirations of the Jews, eroded any belief in peaceful coexistence, and undermined its credibility. And not only was the possibility of coexistence denied, but

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even the very existence of both nations was challenged. Sooner or later, most leaders succumbed to the idea that conflict was unavoidable, and that the issue could only be defined in terms of victory here versus defeat there -- which led to certain political, military, and ideological conclusions. Ben Gurion's memorable confession in 1944 about his partition plan (The Baltimore Plan) was a heartbreaking revision of his previous approach, which had suffered many blows in the past. Those like Buber, Magnes, Ernst Simon, Kalvarisky, Aharon Cohen, and Ben-tov, who continued to believe that only reciprocal recognition could guarantee the national rights of both the Arabs and the Jews, were isolated and "quarantined". They were condemned as utopian dreamers by some, and as trouble-making defeatists by others. Their voice was soon drowned out by the roar of the cannons. But despite having to go through these merciless and hateful wars, most of the Jewish population of Palestine (the *Yishuv*) longed for peace and was genuinely eager for reconciliation. Confrontation was declared to be an unavoidable, endurable, yet deplorable and disastrous evil. The victory in the 6 Day War led to the "transformation of disaster into virtue" (to quote the German expression). A complete reversal of the principles, values and aims of Zionism was effected. Paradoxically, the most slanderous accusations of Arab propaganda became "self-fulfilling prophecies". In 1956, Israel acted together with declining imperialist countries during the Sinai War. In 1967, "Israeli expansionism", at the expense of the three belligerent Arab states, became a fact. No state is ever eager to give up conquered territories; and historic rights, sacred attachment to ancestral land, security problems, and last but not least, stubborn Arab rejectionism (the three "nos" of Khar-toun), accompanied by blind Palestinian terrorism, all facilitated Israel's mental adaptation to its new condition. An oppressed people became an oppressor people.

A Sad Symmetry

That is how the Zionist Movement -- the best example of a self-determination which was achieved in spite of many obstacles --

came to deny that same right to the Palestinians. The argument which is presented -- the PLO's criminal and insane behavior -- cannot justify such a refusal. Shouldn't we recall the history of many new states whose independence was won with the aid of savage terrorist activities? And imagine what would have been the situation if Begin, and not Ben Gurion, had been the leader of the Jewish *Yishuv* in 1948. Begin, the leader of the Irgun, like the Palestinians today, stubbornly rejected the U.N. resolutions, and did not refrain from using terrorist methods against English soldiers and Arab civilians (Dir Yassin). If these methods had been dominant, perhaps the State of Israel would not have been established. But, if such a historical catastrophe had occurred, would it have invalidated or reduced the Jewish people's right to self-determination and national independence? The obvious answer is no. It is well known that extreme nationalism is characterized by a refusal to recognize equal rights and reciprocal duties. Thus, the rise of revisionist neo-Zionism to power has resulted in a sad symmetry between two equally absurd and self-destructive rejectionist approaches, which could lead the tragic conflict to a dead end. Just as the Palestinians, 30 years ago, sacrificed their chance to independence because of their strong animosity towards the creation of a Jewish state, so the present Israeli government may miss the historic opportunity for an immediate reconciliation with the leading Arab state (Egypt), because of its anti-Palestinian obsession, posed as an untouchable national taboo.

Zionist Rejuvenation

Was the idealistic phase only the initial generator of the Jewish national liberation movement? And after the movement's aim has been reached, has it inexorably aged to the point of denying its past and of bartering abstract values for material goods? Have the vital sense of justice and equity of the movement become a heavy and unwanted burden for a state which relies on strength for its survival? For Israel, these politics would signify not only a crime, they would be an error of gigantic proportions. Have we forgotten that the establishment of the state does

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not imply the full achievement of Zionism? Aren't we aware that 80% of the Jewish people still is in the Diaspora, threatened by two mortal dangers; by rapid assimilation, and by the vicissitudes of the precarious lives of minorities. That is why, without Zionism, and without its rejuvenation, neither the permanence of the state nor the survival of the people are guaranteed. Just as war was the main instrument of its degeneration, so peace appears to be the condition, *sine qua non*, for the regeneration of Zionism. Only the reconciliation between Jews and Arabs — which will follow the indispensable mutual recognition of Israelis and Palestinians — may inaugurate a new historical era; the era of peace.

Constructive Energy and Moral Radiance

Israeli involvement in the region, in addition to producing incommensurable political and economical advantages for the state, for all of the states in the area, could imbue Zionism with a new vitality. At a time of serious problems in the Third World, aid from a neighboring state for the development of these countries would enhance Israel's prestige and its attractiveness in the eyes of the best of the Jewish youth throughout the world. If Israel today inspires fear, anxiety and commiseration — tomorrow it could once again become an object of admiration — no longer for its military virtues and achievements — but rather for its constructive energy and its moral radiance. Not long ago, Paul Johnson, the editor of the British "New Statesman", could still write about Israel:

"The pro-Israel sympathies current among Social Democrats stem from Israel's democratic socialism rather than from its Zionism. We are not attached to Israel because it is a Jewish state, but rather because it is socialistic. Its foremost economic bodies are in public hands. Their management is not derived from the wealthy classes or from the prestigious schools, but from the kibbutz communities. Their public ownership is effected without disturbing democratic control. This is a unique combination which a Socialist fails to find elsewhere on this globe. This is in contradistinction to what

is found in Arab lands, despite their revolutions."

Universal Foundations

The uncommon attraction of the *Halutzic* (pioneering) ideals for the generation which built the kibbutz movement would be an enigma, were it not for its universalistic foundation. Beyond the wishes for the redemption of the Jewish people and for the upbuilding of its country, there was a prodigious ambition to give birth to a new society, a new man, a new prototype for the future of humanity.

If, among the many achievements of Israel, only the kibbutz attracts universal admiration, this is not sheer coincidence. Without such a social message — which offers an answer to problems and vital needs of all peoples in the area, and throughout the world, "statist standardization" would deny Zionism its "soul" and would reduce it to the level of ordinary nationalism. Such a movement presents no interest to other peoples, it is not even endowed with the power of attraction towards the scattered Jewish people, as the current acute crisis of the Zionist movement indicates. If the present status quo will continue, the crisis will be aggravated.

Only peace can enable Israel and the Zionist movement to break the infernal circle of solitude and hatred. Only peace can enable Israel to change its image of harshness and intransigence. Only peace may create new conditions for a Zionist revolution; a renewal and a return to sources, an upheaval of norms, criteria, and priorities.

Such a revolution is not just an abstract and pious concept. It is an utmost requirement for a realistic political approach. The first phase of Zionism was the return of the Jewish people to its homeland. The next historic phase of our national rebirth — which peace would begin — has to be Israel's union with other nations.

If we will it — it will be no legend.

Postscript

The above lines were written before the Camp David Conference. The agreement that was reached between Israel and Egypt

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proves that peace is not only desirable and worthwhile, it is possible, despite the doubts and opposition of many on both sides of the border. But we should still emphasize that peace is still only a possibility. Many, both at home and abroad, are waiting for it to fail, and even if -- as we hope -- a peace treaty will be signed between Israel and the largest and most important Arab state -- it will not yet be a stable and lasting peace. The stability of peace will only be guaranteed if it stands on two feet.

Israelis and Palestinians

The main conflict is between the Israeli people and the Palestinian people, and as long as it will not be resolved, no genuine peace will come to be in our region. In order to reach this goal, we must overcome two main obstacles. The first -- is the stubborn refusal of the Palestinian leaders to fulfill a condition, without which even Egypt would not have succeeded in recovering her conquered territories from Israel; a complete and unconditional recognition of the rights of the Israeli nation to its homeland, while giving up the false and hollow slogan of a "democratic, secular, Palestinian state". The second obstacle is the policy of the Government of Israel. After the illusion of a territorial status quo on all fronts was shattered, the Begin Government is cultivating a more limited il-

lusion, but one which is no less damaging: the possibility of reaching a separate peace with Egypt, which will allow for the continuation of Israeli rule in the West Bank and on the Golan Heights. This illusion will not last for long, neither for ten more years, or even for the 5 years proposed for by the autonomy plan. The dynamics of the peace process will be accelerated by some powerful factors: American pressure will increase and grow. The consolidation of American interests in the region will require the prevention of Egypt's isolation, by inducing Jordan to join the peace process, and by gaining the blessings and support of Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even by inducing Syria to join the process towards a comprehensive settlement. But a necessary condition for achieving all of these goals is a solution which will satisfy the national aspirations of the Palestinians.

Thus, the circle is closed, and the dispute returns to its historical starting point: the existence of two nations which are fated to live side by side. Blood-filled historical experience, and considerations of wisdom, emotion, and justice, require us to conclude that we must base our relations upon mutual recognition, peace, and cooperation.

The struggle for peace -- a complete and stable peace -- must continue, and the possibilities of success are today much greater than they ever were before.

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SUDAN

OPPOSITION LEADER DESCRIBES UNREST IN SUDAN

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Jan 79 pp 28-29

[Interview with Opposition Leader Sharif Husayn al-Hindi; "Numayri Violated Conciliation Agreement"; in Paris, date of interview not given]

[Text] During his visit to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's office in Paris, Sudanese leader Sharif Husayn al-Hindi disclosed the hidden phenomena which made the national peace in Sudan mere ink on paper. Sharif al-Hindi directly accused the Sudanese regime of failing to carry out any of the conditions of the agreement.

Sharif al-Hindi related in detail the conditions and circumstances which made al-Sadiq al-Mahdi leave Sudan in embarrassment. He also drew a bleak picture of the internal situation, assuring us of the opposition's ability to bring down the regime without bearing arms against it. Finally, he lifted the veil from the presence of naval, air and ground forces in Sudan to support the Numayri regime and protect it from popular tremors.

Perhaps it is worth noting that the waves of popular discontent in Sudan are crystallizing in widespread strikes. The latest of these was the open strike this week begun by 40,000 elementary school teachers demanding improvement in their living conditions.

At the same time, reports are circulating about movements and rebellious disorders in Southern Sudan, to place the Sudanese situation open to many possibilities.

Perhaps the following conversation with Sharif Husayn al-Hindi completes some links in the picture of the Sudanese situation.

[Question] As a member of the National Front, you accused President Ja'far Numayri's regime of failing to fulfill any of the conditions of the national reconciliation. What will the Front's position be in confronting the regime?

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[Answer] In the past, the National Front participated in several armed civilian and military confrontations and led popular confrontations, demonstrations, strikes, civil disobedience, and various riots. However, according to the information I now have about the deteriorating situation in Sudan, the gathering of all individuals of the Sudanese people in the opposition, and the acute incompatibility between the leadership of the regime and the rest of the groups of the Sudanese people--including the armed forces--I now believe that all of this collective formation of blocs which constitutes complete and total opposition is a substitute for the need to bear arms against the Numayri regime.

Egyptian Forces Present

[Question] How much truth is there to what is being said about Egyptian forces being present in Sudan?

[Answer] I am certain that there are Egyptian forces in Sudan. There are naval forces in Port Sudan, air forces at the Wadi al-Sayyidnah and Khartoum air bases, and ground forces in Khartoum and in the east, south and west of Sudan.

We have information that the number of these forces is continually increasing, especially recently. That is in addition to their penetration of other sensitive apparatuses, such as the security agencies and others.

Egyptians Have Increased Tension

[Question] What is your position concerning these Egyptian forces in case they move to protect the Numayri regime?

[Answer] In my opinion, the presence of Egyptian forces in Sudan, especially at this time, and their taking over protection of the regime has increased the intensity of the tension between the Numayri regime, the people and their armed forces, especially since these forces were withdrawn from confrontation with the Israeli enemy in order to confront conquered, starving, helpless people.

The deep-rooted historical links between the Egyptian and Sudanese people and armies make using the Egyptian army to subjugate the Sudanese people a matter of calling for grief and sorrow. However, as a conquered and wronged people fighting for our freedom and our rights, we cannot be blamed if we defend our land and our rights against imported armies. These armies which weak regimes bring in to oppose their people cannot fight and win in an unfriendly climate and against people who do not accept their presence.

It has become known that national armies themselves, if they control their people, cannot overcome the will of these people, no matter how much they are armed and no matter how strong their might and the effectiveness of their weapons. There is an example which emphasized our belief now in Iran, where the Iranian army, which had been considered one of the five strongest armies in the world, stood isolated and defeated before the revolution, wrath and tremor of the Iranian people.

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Rebellion in the South

[Question] Sudanese opposition sources say that there are movements hostile to the regime in the South. However, Joseph Lagu, head of regional autonomy in the South, has denied that.

[Answer] The facts confirm that there are student and popular demonstrations in all areas of the Southern region, particularly in the Jonglei region. We can even say that there is an actual rebellion in Southern Sudan. There are whole cities which have been subdued and occupied by the rebels. Perhaps Joseph Lagu, head of the Executive Council in the South, meant that these movements are not opposed to his local government but to the central authority. This is true, because this movement is part of the Sudanese people's movement in the south, north, east and west against the ruling regime in Khartoum and against its incorrect national and international policy.

The popular movement now present in the Sudanese South is not an ethnic or separatist movement and is in no case directed against the Arabs. Rather, it is a popular tremor in the form of armed confrontations directed against the regime in Khartoum, against the joint defense agreement between Sudan and Egypt, and also against imaginary projects of integration.

There are similar movements taking place in all parts of Sudan, but they are marked by a thick veil of gloom domestically, on the Arab scene, and internationally, while the problem of the South is emphasized to stir up racial fears.

[Question] Is there coordination between the National Front and the movements in the South of Sudan?

[Answer] The opposition is one in the whole country, and it is opposition against the current regime. This opposition has complete coordination in determining its plans and programs according to their timing.

Southern Sudan suffers from starvation, chaos, loss of basic commodities, poor administration, and sectarian and corrupt policies by the central authority in Khartoum, exactly as the North suffers. This is not strange, and this situation is shaking the Sudanese people in the South and North in different forms. I believe that this is only the beginning.

No Subordination

[Question] In an interview which he granted recently, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi said that he could remove the subordination of the Sudanese opposition and its link to others. What is your opinion?

[Answer] In this area, I would like to confirm that the Sudanese nationalist movement is known historically for its independence and lack of subordination to any party or regime, and I want to say a word which in all fairness must be said. There is no subordination, suggestion, or collaboration in the

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relationship of the Libyan Republic to the Sudanese nationalist movement. It is a link of the Arab struggle which has existed, does exist, and will continue to exist with the Sudanese people nationally and with the Arab people as a people.

On this occasion, I also want to refer to Sadiq al-Mahdi's statement in the same interview that Ethiopia is trying to weaken Sudan for racial and ethnic reasons. I believe that this is untrue. There are no racial or ethnic questions between Sudan and Ethiopia, and there are no racial and ethnic questions within Ethiopia itself. There is one Ethiopian people which did away with the sectarian imperial authority, and there were alliances for the rule of the Ethiopian people as a whole.

Riddle of Nature of Sadiq al-Mahdi

[Question] Have you met with Sadiq al-Mahdi since he left Sudan?

[Answer] We have not yet met with Sadiq al-Mahdi since he left. We do not know why he left, and we do not know whether he is an opponent or a supporter of the regime. He says that he is an opponent of the Camp David agreements, noting that these agreements really began with Sadat's visit to the occupied land when al-Sadiq was at the peak of harmony with Numayri. On the other hand, he confirms that he is part of the regime, that he will participate in it and that he is not an opponent of it.

We do not know al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's political nature. Is he part of the regime as he says he is? Is he opposed to some of the policies of the regime, as he opposes some of the participants in this regime? Is he an opponent? All of this is a mystery, and therefore we see no use in meeting with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. We consider ourselves to be in opposition, since the Numayri regime violated the agreement on which the peace must be based. Consequently we cannot meet with al-Sadiq until we understand clearly whether he is an opponent of the regime.

Numayri Violated Agreement

[Question] Let us go back to the beginning. What are the conditions of the peace which the Numayri regime failed to implement which led to your decision not to return to Sudan?

[Answer] We offered 15 conditions. They included repealing the state security law. In the first article of the 20 April, 1977 agreement, the authority recognized that this law is incompatible with all democratic rights. They also included liberalizing public freedom; relying on the principle of the separation of power; defining the powers of the president of the republic; avoiding a policy of capitulation in the area; supporting the right of the Palestinians to determine their own fate and establish their state; abolishing the bipartite mutual defense agreement between Egypt and Sudan to avoid a policy of being dragged into regional axis; following a policy of positive neutrality and impartiality; and supporting African liberation movements.

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In return, we agreed to end the opposition in the National Front, have all the fighters abroad return, and stop armed battles and turn over our weapons to the Sudanese forces.

The authority pledged to hold free elections for parliament, which will have full legislative authority and the complete right to supervise the executive authority. It also agreed to abolish the political apparatus now existing and to replace it with an elected national council which would have supreme authority.

However, the authority has not yet fulfilled any of the conditions of the reconciliation, either on the national level or the Arab level, although more than 20 months have passed since the reconciliation agreement was signed. On the contrary, a glaring violation of these conditions occurred on the Arab level when the authority agreed to Sadat's visit to the occupied Arab lands and to his initiative which ended in the Camp David agreement.

In light of the delay in implementing the promises and commitments, it was clear to us that the regime does not intend to have a national or Arab agreement. Instead, it wants to contain the opposition and draw it into the ranks of the regime to solve its domestic and foreign problems.

For all of these reasons, we refused to return and refused to join the ranks of the regime. We felt that there was no agreement as long as the agreement which was written, signed, and announced internationally has been rejected by the authority in Sudan, and we have reached the point of dissolving it.

[Question] What are your impressions about al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's departure from Sudan?

[Answer] When al-Sadiq al-Mahdi went to Sudan the first time he was starting from his commitment to the conditions of the reconciliation as determined in the meeting of the Political Office of the Sudanese National Front. However, in his negotiations with Numayri, as he himself explained to us and as intermediaries explained, he did not agree with him on anything. When he returned to meet with us, he started off by saying that Numayri had changed and that he was confident of the sincerity of his efforts on behalf of the settlement. Thus, what al-Mahdi presented relied only on confidence in [his] impression of the change which he saw and felt in Numayri. However, we had another opinion. We explained to him that we had popular and national demands, and we could not rely solely on these feelings of a change in Numayri's personality. Consequently, we could not accept a peace concluded in individual meetings between al-Sadiq and Numayri without taking into consideration the conditions which we set down as a basis for the reconciliation.

This occurred in our first meeting with al-Mahdi after he left Sudan the first time. During this meeting he requested that the opposition return to Sudan and join the ranks of the regime. Naturally, we refused.

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It became clear later that the conversation between al-Mahdi and Numayri had no effect. All that happened was that a minister from al-Mahdi's group joined the executive authority, and a number of his aides were chosen for the People's Council and the Central Committee of the Socialist Union in its present form.

Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi joined the authority without written condition and without any mention at all of oral conditions.

After that it was clear as a matter of course that the confidence which al-Sadiq had placed in Numayri was shaken, especially after he was faced in Khartoum with the radio constantly repeating: "Why did you bear arms against the May Revolution? Why have you returned to join us now although laws limiting freedoms exist, and the prisons exist, and their doors are open?" The radio continued to repeat this for days without any justification except a desire to humiliate.

It must be mentioned that it is well-known that the masses on whom al-Sadiq relies did not believe in the unconditional reconciliation. The opposition continued and confronted al-Sadiq himself with this: The Sudanese opposition was no longer party or sectarian opposition, but popular nationalist opposition assembling all Sudanese forces. On this basis, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi found himself in a predicament which led him to leave Sudan again. No one can determine now whether his departure is final or temporary.

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TUNISIA

MAJOR INVESTMENTS SLATED FOR MINING, IRRIGATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 pp 441-442

[Article: "Tunisia"]

[Text] Industrial Projects

Elaborating on the information on industrial activity in Tunisia provided on the basis of the results of the first half of 1978 (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 9 February 1979 page 309) and as we had announced, we propose to survey the country's industrial projects. We cite below only those projects approved by the Fifth Development Plan of 1977-81 which are either in the process of realization or at a very advanced stage.

Furthermore, the API [Investment Promotion Agency] approved in the initial 9 months of 1978 nearly 1,000 private industrial projects representing aggregate investment of 138.7 million Tunisian dinars. Nearly half of these projects involve new plants.

1. Mines

A major effort is anticipated in this field for the improvement or modernization of the phosphate mines:

a. Improvement of the Schib mine: Total cost, 38 million dinars. Its foreign exchange portion is financed by the World Bank and France; 8 million dinars were committed in 1978.

b. Open pit exploitation of a new deposit at Kef Echfaier: Total cost, 37.4 million dinars; 7 million dinars committed in 1978.

c. Modernization of the mines of M'Dhilla (13.7 million dinars), Metlaoui (2.7 million dinars), and Redeyef (2.9 million dinars); 6 million dinars estimated in 1978.

d. For nonferrous metals 2.5 million dinars were anticipated for 1978 making possible the entrance of the Fej Hassine zinc mine into full production.

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2. Energy

The Fifth Development Plan seems to have been ambitious in this sector for some projects already are beginning to see the deadline for their realization postponed.

a. Sousse thermal power station (300 megawatts: Cost, 70 million dinars whose financing is provided by German and Austrian suppliers' credits; 13 million dinars were estimated in 1978 to continue the realization of this project; the end of the first stage is set for 1980; the operation of the power plant is to be by means of fuel oil pending natural gas from southern Tunisia.

b. Installation of gas turbines in the cities of Sfax, Menzel Bourguiba, and Metlaoui, increasing the installed power from 390 megawatts (1976) to 840 megawatts (1981); cost, 13.5 million dinars of which 10.8 million dinars in foreign exchange to be financed in part by the World Bank and suppliers' credit.

c. Exploitation of the Miskar offshore gas: Total cost, 205 million dinars; an agreement was made between the Tunisian Government and the ERAP-Aquitaine [Petroleum Exploration and Activities Enterprises-Aquitaine] group for a studies and research program.

As of 30 June 1978 10 million dinars had already been committed, but the Tunisian Government decided to delay the realization of that project while waiting to become better acquainted with the reserves of the deposit and the cost of gas extraction. This program will start to be carried out only if the boring of a single complementary well proves to be sufficient.

d. Extension of the Bizerte refining capacity (STIR [Tunisian-Italian Refining Company]): Cost, 90 million dinars; the study is under way and Tunisia prefers to carry on this financial sacrifice and to continue to import inexpensive [crude] oil.

e. Completion of the water injection program at the El Borma and Ashtart oil fields: The last installment of 25.5 million dinars was paid in 1978.

f. The year 1979 will witness the start-up of the laying of the Algerian-Tunisian-Italian intercontinental gas pipeline. A network of secondary gas pipelines is planned so as to transport the gas from this supply source to the consumption centers.

III. Manufacturing industries

A. Agricultural and food industries

1. Kairouan tobacco complex.--Production estimated at 300 million packs a year which will subsequently reach 530 million. Total cost, 21 million

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dinars of which 6.1 million dinars in the form of outside foreign exchange credit slated for the acquisition of special equipment. Start-up of the plant's operation: 1981, with a production of 40 million packs.

2. Construction of a new sugar refinery.--Unit capable of processing 400 tons of sugar beets daily (production capacity: 250,000 tons of sugar a year). The cost continues to be undetermined. The technical study has been presented for financing within the framework of technical cooperation with Belgium.

B. Construction materials industries

1. Extension of the Bizerte cement plant increasing its capacity from 660,000 tons a year. Estimated cost revised to 42 million dinars. Financing: Contract with the Danish company of F. L. Smith (June 1976) for the supply of equipment and German loan (KFW [Credit Development Bank]) of 133 million Deutschmarks (March 1976).

2. Western cement works.--Annual capacity of 1.2 million tons of cement and 120,000 tons of artificial lime. Cost, 64 million dinars of which 70 percent in the form of outside credit. An agreement concluded in July 1976 with the French Fives-Cail-Babcock company calls for the supply of the plant in turn-key condition 49 months after the agreement went into effect (end 1980). Already, 14 million dinars were committed as of 31 December 1977 and 30 million dinars were slated to be earmarked in 1978.

3. A cement works in central Tunisia (at Enfidha) with a capacity of 1 million tons a year (3,000 tons of clinkers). Estimated cost: 71.5 million dinars of which 50.5 million in the form of outside credit.

4. Two hydraulic lime plants with a capacity of 200,000 tons a year. Total cost: 16 million dinars.

5. Other projects are under way or under study and bear on three quarries (2.1 million dinars), two brick kilns, tile plants, one prefabricated elements plant, a sixth cement works, a white cement works, a plateglass plant, and a unit for the production of items in asbestos-cement at Bizerte (capacity: 21,000 tons a year beginning in 1979; cost, 4.5 million dinars).

C. Mechanical and electric industries

Even though important and anticipated under the Fifth Development Plan, the prospects included in this sector are relegated to second rank on the scale of priorities and will witness delay in their realization.

1. Construction of a mechanical complex for the production of diesel engines and mechanical parts.

2. Extension of the Al-Fouladh iron and steel plant's production capacity to 225,000 tons in 1980 through the installation of a new electric furnace. Cost: 10 million dinars of which 7 million in foreign credit.

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3. Increase in steel and iron production capacity. Cost: 200 million dinars.

4. Construction of two plants at Sousse, one of them for the assembly of light automobiles (8,000 a year) and the other for the trucking industry (1,200 a year). Cost: 2.7 million dinars.

5. One production unit of flat rolled items as well as steel rings and sections at Bizerte. Cost: 6 million dinars; production: 100,000 tons a year; financing: Tunisian banks, Tunisian and Italian industrialists.

6. The other projects involve a unit for the production of dry batteries and electric equipment, the building of a metallic construction unit at Gabes (3.1 million dinars), of another to produce sections at Menzel Bourguiba (3.5 million dinars), and completion of the building of a drilling platform at Sousse.

D. Chemical industries

1. SEPA [Phosphated and Nitrogenous Fertilizer Company] project at Gabes. For a total cost of 184.0 million dinars, this project envisions construction and exploitation of a complex for the production of phosphated and nitrogenous fertilizers from natural resources (phosphate and gas).

The first stage; 82.5 million dinars of which 60 million dinars in foreign exchange. A contract was signed in June 1976 between SEPA and the French firm of Heurtey Industries for the delivery of a turnkey plant (58.6 million dinars). Abu Dhabi's participation is 40 percent. A sum of 25.1 million dinars had been committed as of 31 December 1977 (30 percent of the project). Putting into industrial service scheduled for September 1979.

2. The second stage (101.5 million dinars) is tied to the production of gas offshore and will have to be postponed because of the uncertainties weighing on this program.

3. Extension of the ICM [Chemical Industries of the Maghreb].

E. Textile industries

1. Increase of the production capacity of the Sousse spinning plant in order that capacity may reach 5,500 tons and of the Ksar Helal [Hellal] weaving plant to 8 million meters of indigo fabrics. These productions are planned for export. Cost estimated at 5.6 million dinars.

Agricultural Investments: 109 Million Dinars in 1979

For Tunisia, the year 1979 should be an important year for more than one reason in the agricultural sector. It will constitute a kind of examination which will consecrate the triumph or failure of the agricultural policy.

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That is what L'ACTION, the Tunis daily, wrote in its issue of 4 January 1979 on presenting the investment program of this sector for 1979.

Investments slated for agriculture for 1979 are in the order of 109 million dinars, that is, 20 percent more than in 1978 (90.2 million dinars).

If one wishes to break down these investments one finds that 50.9 million dinars are earmarked to irrigation, 11.8 million to livestock raising, 5.5 million to tree cultivation, 15 million to agricultural equipment, 3.2 million to fishing, 6 million to forests and soil and water conservation and 11.6 million to various other agricultural activities.

Accordingly, the lion's share goes to irrigation because of the significance of the projects under way (Sidi Salem and Sidi Saadi dams) and new projects (Medjerda-Cap Bon Canal and outfitting of the Medjez El Bab-Testour region).

Sixty-seven percent of total investments (73 million dinars) originates from the public sector and the rest, that is, 33 percent (36 million dinars), from the private sector.

On its part, the Special Agricultural Development Fund should invest some 14 million dinars broken down as follows (in millions of dinars):

WFP [World Food Program] 482 project	1,000
German Irrigation Fund	50
Special Fishing Development Fund	2,500
Project in cooperation with the Swedish Development Agency	200
Improvement of irrigated public land laid out in cooperation with the German Democratic Republic	100
Modernization of irrigation canals in the lower Medjerda valley and the Nebhana region	700
Improvement of the productivity of small- and intermediate-sized agricultural farms at Beja, Nabeul, Zaghouan, and Siliana	750
Equipment for irrigation	1,700
Rural housing	500
Crops	600
Irrigation	1,000
Fodder	50
Forests and soil conservation	300

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TUNISIA

DESTOURIAN PARTY PREPARES CONGRESS, WOOS YOUTH

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Mar 79 pp 611-612

[Text] President Bourguiba returned to Tunis on 10 January, after he had long, effective medical sojourns in Switzerland, France and finally in the Federal Republic of Germany, in 1978. As usual, he was greeted by an enthusiastic crowd and he addressed the Tunisian people in a language suitable for stimulating their hopes and energy. In fact, no one is unaware of the fact that 1979 should be a decisive year for Tunisia, because of the General Congress of the Destourian Socialist Party. For many Tunisian citizens, the "supreme fighter" will be the one who will give that plenary meeting of the party its character, its strength and its direction. Many things may depend on those Destourian sessions, regardless of whether they confirm more or less completely this kind of present status quo that must foreshadow a "time after Bourguiba" without surprises or shocks, or whether they will outline an evolution designed to renovate the facts and development of political activity in Tunisia.

Some think that the slightest sign made by President Bouguiba would suffice to start the change. They do not rule out the fact that that may come about, in the coming months. In fact, the "supreme fighter", far from withdrawing into an august retirement, continues to follow, or rather, to guide public affairs, with an attention so keen that it often seems apprehensive. It may be thought that he will not rely entirely on the "absolutely safe" solution established by his care to assure the perpetuity of the regime. It is possible, therefore, to imagine that, under some sudden inspiration, he may possibly introduce into the Destourian machinery ideas or men capable of upsetting the reassuring arrangement of the present norms, structures and provisions. Because "Bourguibism," for him, has never been synonymous with "immobilism." An episode like the sudden reconciliation with Libya, several months ago, shows that he always knows how to impose his will, when the occasion arises suddenly and abruptly.

Nevertheless, those are nonconformist opinions for which no official person in Tunisia accepts responsibility. The present party machinery, to which the government is closely tied, has absolute stability for a dogma

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and believes that its duty is to watch over it strictly. Moreover, everything that has been undertaken or everything that has happened during the last few years aims at or leads to making the slightest deviation or even the slightest inflection impossible. Although it is still understood that any idea may be submitted within the party, in fact the "liberals" and their sympathizers have been separated from its ranks and especially from its executive organizations. Although it is still agreed that labor unionism may have opinions to propose, the purge that it underwent after the 26 January 1978 events will certainly not favor expression of original views.

The symptoms of evolution that might appear, nevertheless, within the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] and the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] could only be slightly perceptible, at first. Therefore, in spite of its redundant monotony, the development of internal political activity in Tunisia will continue to be observed carefully. Some signs might appear in it, in the course of time. But, without doubt, it would be imprudent to extrapolate too quickly and to regard any softening of language or gesture of opening as significant.

Problems of a "Changing Society" Treated Prudently

As anticipated, the Political Bureau of the Destourian Socialist Party stresses right away the importance of the current year. The proclamation commemorating 18 January, the date marking, in 1952, "entrance by the national liberation movement into its decisive phase," provided it with the opportunity to bring up the two principal events of the coming months: party congress and legislative elections. It does that by stressing primarily the role of the congress and of the party. It uses terms capable of giving a strong impression of stability and, at the same time, of desire for progress:

"The national congress of the party is the broader framework in which the nation's elite assume responsibility, on behalf of the people, to evaluate the nation's progress and to mark out the way in the country's near and distant future. Because the nation has the right to require the party to state its basic problems clearly. The Tunisian people, because of their ambition and characteristics of vitality and action, still aspire to a constantly better level. The authenticity of the Destourian Socialist Party, the permanence of its mission and of its objectives, the popularity of its structures and the nature of its methods of working make up the most appropriate framework within which the active forces can act on behalf of the people, in order to continue moving toward progress and prosperity and to ensure consistency and success. With regard to the legislative elections, they will be an opportunity to evaluate legislative activity and its direct effect on the functioning of state institutions and their structures, as well as on the life of the community and of its members. The congress will be held on the scheduled date and will be the beginning of a broad national dialog undertaken in every region and at every level."

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The prime minister, Hedi Nouira, who spoke on the same day in the small city of Nabeul, on the edge of the fertile Cap Bon District, which has set an example for the country's other regions because of its wisdom, adhered, as usual, to the economic and social aspects of the government's activity. Also as usual, he said that, on the whole, he was pleased with the results already obtained. He suggested that young persons visit other countries, with a view to making a comparison and to making a good "evaluation of the scope of the action undertaken." But he immediately added some remarks that make not a little room for the idea of movement:

"We have reached a stage, both decisive and critical, the stage of an upsurge on the economic, social and political levels, because Tunisian society is changing. That is why evolution must be made parallelly on those three levels."

Just as immediately, in addition, the prime minister warned Tunisian society, "whose ambitions are numerous," not to disregard the fact that Tunisia misses a number of facts in economic evolution, because they depend on the cost of imported equipment and raw materials. "Therefore, we have to sell, and, in order to sell, our products must be competitive. This shows that everything is interdependent." This observation was immediately moderated by another remark: an excessive number of personnel is maintained in some administrations and enterprises, with a view to safeguarding employment. "There is a moral problem there that must not be lost from sight. Because politics is an indivisible whole."

In this same order of ideas, Hedi Nouira confirmed the fact that the authorities "give favorable consideration to everything that can improve working conditions and facilitate the wage earners' task." In this connection, he recommended direct contact between the executives of enterprises and their personnel, in a spirit of solidarity. Moreover, he did not refrain from a final thrust against the regime's detractors who will be countered by "its creative and constructive efforts."

Therefore, in view of this speech, new social measures, but prudently limited, should be expected. This will be the usual "April meeting." But it may possibly be wondered whether there will be political evolution "parallelly, as one passage in that speech seems to announce.

The PSD and Youth

No other sign has come, up to now, to corroborate this very slight indication. On 22 February, President Bourguiba received the director of the PSD, Mohammed Sayah, minister delegate attached to the prime minister. The party chief announced that the party has 765,310 members, or 200,000 more than in 1977. He reported on preparation for the congress and reported that the president has recommended emphasizing national unity in the party's education and orientation activities.

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On the following day, Hedi Nouria presided over a joint meeting of the Political Bureau and of executives of mass organizations. His speech, exclusively economic and social in nature, is another presentation of the action undertaken by the government, of the obstacles encountered, of the reasons for continuing with the greatest prudence. For various reasons, including the "January 1978 tragedy," Tunisian economy has progressed less than expected (gross domestic product 5.7 percent, instead of 7.8 percent) and consumption increased still more (8 percent, instead of 6.6 percent) to the detriment of savings.

On the other hand, noting increases in wages and salaries that went beyond the increase in prices, the prime minister recommended restraint of consumption. He stated that the UGTT "will have to protect work more than the workers," and the other organizations will have to join in this action by making an effort to create the greatest number of jobs. He put special emphasis on the need for guaranteeing young persons "a job that will enable them to be incorporated in society," because, as he added with a sudden touch of pessimism, "the day will come when those who have a job, regardless of how small it is, will be happy in comparison with those who have no job."

This attention paid to the problems of youth will be especially noted. This kind of direction is certainly not new in Tunisia, but from now on it is certified with a completely remarkable vigor and continuity. Moreover, although the PSD is at the bottom of this effort on behalf of young persons, it does not always give it a "partisan" slant. The problem is taken up and treated from various, complementary points of view.

The minister of national education, Mohammed Mzali, who frequently tackles these problems of youth before teachers and party officials, but also before young persons themselves at the time of school youth congresses, commented on the aims of the teaching reform being implemented at present. This reform intends to open up schools better to the industrial and agricultural environment, for the purpose of tying education to employment and thus giving it an "immediately operational" objective, so that valid openings may be obtained for students. Education seeks, therefore, to adapt itself to the peculiarities and possibilities of each region and to meet the needs revealed by the job market and by local economic development.

From this point of view, primary education is changed into "fundamental education" that, owing to its extension in the seventh and eighth year, prepares young persons to go straight into active life. It is being stated now that the too theoretical education of former times kept education at a distance from the social environment in which it was and contributed to a removal of the students from their surroundings. A training adapted to local situations and to jobs available or created on the spot will favor, on the other hand, attachment of the student and family stability.

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Moreover, it is advisable -- and the minister in charge of the Plan, Moustafa Zabbibbu, readily stresses this, for development projects not to aim merely at improving living conditions, but for them to be inspired, on a priority basis, by a desire to create jobs. The Destourian executives and officials plead in favor of jobs in agriculture, in handicrafts, in manual trades. The insistence with which they recommend concrete possibilities of modest but probably stable earnings is striking.

In this connection, civil service is often described as making it possible to enhance manual work in the eyes of young persons who perform it to the benefit of the nation and who regard it, therefore, as more noble. Nevertheless, Mohammed Mzali, in turn, also points out political training of young persons as necessary. When he laid the cornerstone of a high school in Ouardenine, in the Sahel, on 22 January, he stated that it will be necessary to help young persons fill the void that they feel deeply and to train them spiritually and materially so that they will be able to protect the nation against any destructive aim, "regardless of where it comes from."

This political training must be broad and open. It is desirable for it to be carried out by way of dialog. A prominent person, often portrayed as authoritative, Mohammed Sayah, director of the party, stated, on 20 January, before the Young Destourians in Kalaa Kebira, in the Sahel, that nothing must prevent young persons from tackling all problems and from becoming aware of all theories. Tunisian youth will be able to differentiate between good and bad and to make judicious choices.

But more "directive" guidelines can also be recorded. Tijani Makni, deputy and mayor of Sfax, member of the Political Bureau of the PSD, stated, when he addressed the Youth Congress of the South Sfax cell on 21 January, that it is incumbent of that organization to "polarize" young persons, to ensure them of a sound political training and to involve them in the work of development. When Slaheddine Baly, minister of Justice, member of the PSD Political Bureau, presided over the Youth Congress of the Destourian cell of the City of Tunis, on 16 February, he urged that organization to make young persons aware of the party's principles. When Mahmoud Charchour, assistant director of the party, addressed the School Youth in Sousse, on 17 February, he stressed the role that youth must play in making young persons aware and in training them in a knowledge of the nation's choices and of the party's ideology. The party "never ceases calling on youth not to confine themselves in purely demanding attitudes" (L'ACTION, 23 January). It also seems absolutely necessary to the editorial writer of the party's newspaper (L'ACTION, 2 February 1979) "to provide young persons with a political training that will teach them to revolt at extremism and to adhere to constructive dialog and to respect for others."

Slaheddine Baly concluded, besides, that by opening up to young persons, the party is deciding in favor of renovating its structures, and its 10th congress "will make it possible to determine the shape of the median society that we are working to build." And Fu'ad Mebazaa, minister of Public Health and also a member of the Political Bureau, stated before

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the same audience that "every recommendation to be submitted to the congress will aim at giving preference to youth."

In the eyes of the Destourian leaders, the increasing influx of young persons is the problem of the immediate future. Therefore, an increased training effort is contemplated. Tunisian structures imply that this training be given within the party framework, from those political aspects. But it is not sure that the risks of authoritarianism and of militarization concealed by these points of view will always be perceived clearly.

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TUNISIA

BRIEFS

BOU AOUANE MINERAL DEPOSITS--At the time of the visit that the governor of Jendouba Governorate made on 26 January 1979 to the Bou Aouane mining region, the director of the mine disclosed that a study had confirmed the existence of zinc and lead ore reserves estimated at 6 million tons that will make it possible to continue the exploitation for a 17-year period. Production of the Bou Aouane mines, which now have 821 permanent workers, was estimated at 8,500 tons in 1978. It is projected that it will increase to 10,500 tons in 1979 and to 14,500 tons in 1980. The acquisition of modern equipment which is envisioned should make possible better exploitation and the processing of products before their export. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 442] 2662

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WESTERN SAHARA

POLISARIO'S MAIN AIM TO WIN IMPORTANT MILITARY VICTORIES

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 18 Mar 79 pp 54-55, 57

[Text] It was an impressive sight. Columns of impeccably-uniformed soldiers filed past the main reviewing stand. Behind them, a long line of jeeps carrying ultramodern machine guns, sophisticated antiaircraft materiel and trucks bearing 106 mm recoilless rifles raised clouds of sand. And above the din made by the passing soldiers and engines there was the constant shouting of the women waving the flags of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR].

It was the third anniversary of the birth of the republic, and for those, such as CAMBIO 16's special correspondent Lia Levit, who had witnessed previous ceremonies there was a marked change: An army, rather than eager guerrilla groups, was marching in review. Moreover, the republic was somewhat more than a hope of becoming a complex of institutions and the infrastructure of a carefully organized national state.

"We have won the battle for existence, and now we are resolutely undertaking the struggle for independence," a spokesman for the SDAR told CAMBIO 16. He also revealed that POLISARIO strategy has two prongs: diplomatic activity, reflected in negotiations with Mauritania and Morocco, and military activity. "This is the year in which we go after the Moroccan Army. Now we'll carry the war to the heart of Morocco."

The Diplomatic Struggle

There is no question that the POLISARIO Front's ability to achieve these military objectives directly depends on support from Algeria. Regarding this, the entire process of finding a successor to President Boumediene has witnessed endorsement of the Saharan cause by the various factions of the National Liberation Front.

The POLISARIO's strategic objectives in the military sphere entail the genuine danger of direct confrontation between Algeria and Morocco (See CAMBIO 16, No 376). Alarm concerning this has already been expressed in

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some Arab capitals. Following the events in Iran, the repercussions of which are being felt throughout the region, the confrontation between Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic has disturbed the Arab League, of which Morocco and Algeria are members.

At the league meeting held to formalize the cease-fire in Yemen an effort was again made to establish a policy forbidding warfare among Muslim countries.

Nevertheless, Algeria's complete support for the POLISARIO gives significance to Morocco's announced intention to "exercise the right of pursuit to the enemy's bases." That is, to pursue the Saharan guerrillas to their quarters on the Algerian border.

International Backing

It is within this context that the widespread international support received by the POLISARIO Front has considerable importance.

While within a week Ethiopia and Vietnam recognized the SDAR, in Teheran the Ayatollah Khomeyni received a delegation from the POLISARIO Front, promising its members his country's full support in the struggle. Khomeyni's words, coming on the SDAR's third anniversary, reinforced the POLISARIO leaders' decision to intensify during the coming months the struggle being carried out at all levels by the Saharans to obtain independence for the former Spanish colony.

"Following this third anniversary we Saharans are going to achieve the complete liberation of our territory," Mohamed Lamine--chairman of the SDAR Council of Ministers--said emphatically during the festivities held at the encampment south of Tindouf.

The Saharan prime minister's announcement coincides with the intensification of the military operations composing the "Houari Boumediene Offensive," launched by the POLISARIO Front on 1 January, which had made its deepest thrust on 23 January with the occupation, within 4 daylight hours, of the Moroccan city of Tan-Tan. Having suspended the war on the southern front because of the cease-fire declared in Mauritania, the POLISARIO Front has thrown all its effort into the war in the north, against Morocco.

Delaying Tactics

"We've given the new Mauritanian leadership a golden opportunity to assume its responsibility; but although the train is moving, time is, too, and nothing has been achieved yet," Lamine charged. The Saharan leader blamed the new Mauritanian Government for the stalemate in negotiations, asserting that it was practicing delaying tactics, although it had repeatedly said that its country had no interests to defend in the Western Sahara. Lamine

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revealed that Mohamed Abdelaziz--secretary general of the POLISARIO Front--had held talks with Ould Saleck, president of Mauritania, "in the presence of a senior Arab official." The best guess is Libyan Mu'ammarr Qadhafi. Moreover, Lamine said, high "officials close to Hassan II met with representatives of the POLISARIO Front in an African capital," recognizing the sovereignty of the Saharan people.

"We don't want war," Lamine said, "and that is why we have launched a campaign for peace in the region. If the peace is ruptured, we won't be responsible. Despite everything it has said, Mauritania is continuing to fight, for it is still occupying our territory." Lamine declined to set a deadline for the expiration of the cease-fire if the negotiations with Mauritania do not produce concrete results. He also withheld the nature of the talks with Morocco, although the latter did acknowledge the fact of his group's existence.

Recently there has been widespread talk about the possibility of creating a Saharan mini-state in the region occupied by Mauritania; but the Saharan leaders have rejected this idea outright. "Our people are fighting for complete liberation, and they reject any division intended to destroy national unity," they said.

In view of the presence of over 10 delegations from Asian, African and Latin American countries and of nearly 100 representatives of political parties and liberation movements located throughout the world, Lamine lamented Saudi Arabia's and Iraq's support of Hassan II, "who is using money from a Muslim people to exterminate another Muslim people."

The Saharan prime minister also criticized Spain and France. "Until now," he noted, "the only role that Spain has played has been the one it chose when it signed the hateful tripartite Madrid pact. We hope that it will now play a role which will erase the dishonor." On 15 February the French Government spoke of the Saharan issue--for the first time--as a "problem of decolonization." Saharan leaders considered this an indication of notable progress, although they observed that the error "lies in believing that there's a problem among Spain, Morocco and France. The only problem is the one the Saharan people are having with those aggressing against them." The Algerian Government used the same language in its vigorous protest on rejecting the terms of the statement by French officials proposing a meeting with representatives of Algeria to discuss the issue of the Western Sahara.

While disclaiming participation in the conflict, Algeria--which sent a large delegation to the festivities--reiterated its support of the Saharan people's cause. In a letter addressed to Mauritanian President Ould Saleck, Chadli Bendjedid, the new Algerian head of state, urged Mauritania to "satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Saharan people" as a means of strengthening the bonds between Algeria and Mauritania.

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1979, the Year of Morocco

While in recent months the tide of the diplomatic battle seems to have turned in favor of the Saharan cause, Morocco has experienced, especially in recent weeks, internal social upheavals which aggravate its isolation. The presence of the Shah of Iran and the recent defection of a former deputy and a Moroccan lieutenant to the POLISARIO Front have helped to worsen matters.

Following a fruitless trip to Paris, Hassan II had to acknowledge that after 18 years of his rule, the country was facing a critical situation. With a productivity level of scarcely 50 percent of capacity, Morocco, which has a population of less than 20 million, has over 1 million unemployed and an annual inflation rate of some 15 percent, while wage increases are less than 10 percent.

The government and the opposition agree that the war in the Sahara is a cancer which is devouring the Moroccan economy. Moreover, this mass of wealth being consumed by the war has grown since the POLISARIO Front began its "Houari Boumediene Offensive" on 1 January. Every day the Moroccan Army receives painful blows at various bases in areas it occupies in the Sahara and, more recently, in Moroccan territory itself.

The Saharan leaders state that their forces now control all of the territory except for bases and cities, which Morocco is able to provision only by sea.

Brahim Ghali Ould Mostefa, SDAR minister of defense, said, "When we began the armed struggle we had only seven or eight guns which we took from Spanish soldiers." When over 3,000 fighters for the POLISARIO Front marched in review on 27 February in honor of the third anniversary of the proclamation of the SDAR, they displayed before the press an impressive collection of armament taken, they say, from the Moroccan armed forces. French, Spanish and American equipment passed the reviewing stand. Around 100 Land Rovers bearing machine guns and trucks carrying 106 mm cannons evidenced the notable improvement in the quality of the armament used by the Saharan People's Liberation Army, which even used missiles in the offensive against the Moroccan city of Tan-Tan.

"At present," the defense minister said, "the Moroccan Army has over 70,000 soldiers, to which should be added some 20,000 citizens recruited for the Green March." He estimated that nearly 1,000 Moroccan soldiers have been killed since the beginning of the "Houari Boumediene Offensive."

"For us this year, 1979, will be the year of Morocco and, more precisely, that of the Moroccan armed forces," the defense minister concluded emphatically.

The journalists present at the celebration of the third anniversary of the SDAR were taken on a rapid tour of an encampment in the "wilaya" (province)

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of Semara. Distributed for over 200 kilometers along the border between the Western Sahara and Algeria, the "dairas" (encampments) are grouped into three wilayas: El Aaiun, Dakhla and Semara, each of which is administered by a "wali" (governor). There are now 22 dairas, each with a population of between 4,000 and 7,000 people.

A दौरا is led by a people's committee having six members. Five are in charge of other committees and one is an administrator who votes in the दौरا people's assembly. The five committees are responsible for what are considered the most important tasks: child care, food supply, justice, craftwork and health.

The population of the encampments consists largely of women, the elderly and children, who are organized into cells which meet twice a week.

In accordance with the national education plan, each दौरا has a school which offers preschool and primary training. The 9 of June School serves the entire nation, and children can complete their studies there. Although its buildings have not been finished, 1,100 children (of the 2,000 anticipated) are already receiving instruction in Arabic and Spanish. There are 24 classrooms, each with a capacity of 40 students, with classes being conducted by former students, teenagers belonging to the POLISARIO Front.

Like education, health care is subject to national planning. When we visited the National Hospital, Salek Ould Boujaha, the minister of health, said, "Each दौरا and each wilaya has a committee on health, and each wilaya has a clinic as well as access to this recently-opened National Hospital."

The hospital, with a 400-patient capacity, now has only 300 beds. Regarding this, the minister of health noted that in some instances international assistance has not met expectations. He said that a major difficulty is the scarcity of vehicles for the transportation of patients from the dairas to the hospital.

"People receive not only medical care here," the minister said, "but the hospital also gives sick people and maternity patients courses in reading."

Although it contains a special room for it, the hospital does not have an operating theater because it lacks the necessary equipment.

Despite the limited facilities, Salek Ould Boujaha said he was satisfied with the results. "The health care situation," he remarked, "cannot be separated from our people's evolution in all spheres. Between 1975 and 1976 we had to face the problem caused by the exodus. Thousands of people who left the cities for liberated territory. We had to confront problems with almost nonexistent facilities. Now we can state that our health care system has taken a large step forward."

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